A resident of upstate New York, Tourgee was perhaps the leading white spokesman for people of color. Following (1879) . Continuing his legal and literary career after he returned to New York, he worked to expose the Ku Klux Klan and campaigned for improved conditions for freedmen. Convinced that the only solution to the 'race problem' in the United States was education, both for whites to reduce racial prejudice and for freedmen to increase economic opportunity and to inform them as new citizens, Tourgee actively campaigned for federal money to wipe out illiteracy, which was especially high in the South. His proposal was, however, never adopted. 2 When the New Orleans committee contacted Tourgee, it had raised $1,412.70, but he agreed to work at a distance for no fee. For him the case was part of a larger project to achieve equal rights for all citizens of the United States. An important part of that project was to get the United States Supreme Court to declare segregation laws unconstitutional.
Part of Tourgee's strategy was to have someone of mixed blood violate the • law, since to do so would allow him to question the arbitrariness by which people were classified 'colored'. Homer Plessy agreed to be a test case.
Plessy had been born free in 1862. His family was French-speaking. He had only one-eighth African blood and, according to his counsel, 'the mixt ure [was] not discemable' (Lofgren 1987: 41) . Most likely he could have passed and ridden in the white car without trouble, but the committee wantẽ d a legal challenge. Its challenge received some silent support from railr oad companies, which did not like the added expense of providing separ ate cars. By pre-arrangement the railroad conductor and a private detective detained Plessy when he sat in the forbidden coach.
A month after his arrest Plessy came before the court of Justice john Howard Ferguson. A native of Massachusetts, Ferguson was a carpetbagger who stayed in the South, marrying the daughter of a prominent New Orleans attorney. Between Plessy~s arrest and his trial, Ferguson had ruled on another test case in which Daniel F. Desdunes was arrested for travell ing in the white car on an interstate train. Also someone who could pass as white, Desdunes was the twenty-one-year-old son of Rodolphe Desdunes, one of the leaders of the New Orleans committee. Ferguson ruled that the law was unconstitutional on interstate trains because of the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce, and the committee celebrated. Plessy, however, was travelling on an intrastate train, and at his trial Ferguson upheld the law, arguing that a state had the power to regulate railroad companies operating solely within its borders. The constitutional challenge was underway and the decision was appealed to the state supreme court and eventually to the United States Supreme Court.
As Plessy's argument was that the Louisiana law violated his Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights we need to look at these two amendments, which were the first of three passed after the North's victory over the South in the Civil War. The Thirteenth Amendment reads:
AMENDMENT XIII [1865] Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-, . _ victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
The primary purpose of the Amendment was to make slavery illegal. Itspassage was relatively uncontroversial. But the amendment has a complicated history. Those who proposed it did not see it as the first of three amendments. Instead, they felt that it would be enough to give African Many of these guaranteed ci viI rights, such as making and enforcing contracts and holding and conveying property, are economic rights that had previously been denied to slaves. Guaranteeing these rights to all citizens was part of the campaign to have the entire country adopt the northern economic system.
As fundamental as these rights may seem to us today, sponsors of the 1866 Civil Rights Act worried that its opponents might challenge its constitutionality. Under the federal system of the United States, in which power was divided between the states and the federal government, such rights had traditionally been guaranteed by the states, who were responsible for pro-3S In addition to guaranteeing citizenship, the amendment protects the rights of those who are citizens. Its second sentence makes it unconstitutional for any state to 'make or enforce' laws that 'shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' This provision gave the fed-• eral government important power over the states. Guaranteeing national citizenship rights, it implied that, if someone is a citizen in one state, he or she is automatically a citizen of the entire country, and no state can abridge the 'privileges or immunities' of that citizenship. Once again the language of the amendment was designed to overturn Dred Scott in which Taney declared that just because someone 'has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State,' he is not necessarily a 'citizen of the United States.'7
The second clause of the second sentence is its 'due process' clause. Most of its language simply repeats language from the 5th Amendment. We might ask why this repetition is necessary. It is, because of the addition of the words 'any State.' As in the first clause of this sentence, this clause limited the power of individual states to restrict various rights. Emphasizing the transfer of power from the states to the federal government, it declares unconstitutional a state's effort to 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. '
As similar as the second clause is to the first in giving the federal government control over states, an important change has occurred. The first clause protects 'citizens'; the second, 'any person.' 'Citizens' has a more restricted meaning than 'person.' All citizens of the United States are people, but not all people are citizens of the United States. The authors obviously wanted to make it clear that citizens of the United States have privileges and immunities other than the guaranteed protection of life, liberty, and property.
This distinction is important to keep in mind when we move to the third clause of the second sentence -the 'equal protection' clause. By guaranteeing 'any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws', this clause might seem to grant all people within a state equality under the law. But, 'equal protection of the laws' clearly does not mean that everyone is entitled to the 'privileges and immunities' of United States citizenship. For instance, foreigners living in the United States do not have the rights of United States citizenship.
Both ,proponents and opponents acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment shifted the balance of power in favor of the federal government over the states. Nonetheless, a number of issues of importance for the Plessy case remained unresolved. One was how expansively the amendment should be interpreted to protect the rights of African Americans. Was it simply intended to prohibit states from abridging the privileges and . immunities of citizenship enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Bill, or Law Text Culture » should the scope of its protection be interpreted more widely? There is evidence for both a restricted and an expanded interpretation.(viii)
Even if an expanded interpretation is granted, another issue presents itself. As Alfred H. Kelley puts it, if the two amendments were designed to guarantee equality for African Americans, did the meaning of equality forbid separation by race if equal conditions were provided? (Kelley 1956 : l050)(ix) Once again there is evidence on both sides (Lofgren 1987: 64-7). As we have seen, Democratic opponents of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment warned that they would bring about total integration of the races. At the same time, Senator Lyman Trumbull, who sponsored the Civil Rights Act, argued that it would not threaten state anti-miscegenation laws because, even though such laws prevented integration, they treated blacks and whites the same. Both blacks and whites were forbidden from marrying someone from the other race and both were punished equally if they broke the laws. 10 Prior to 1896 the Supreme Court established precedents that adopted a restricted interpretation of both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, but before Plessy it had not explicitly ruled on the issue of separate but equal on intrastate public transportation. It is time, therefore, to tum the Supreme Court's answer to Tourgee's claim that the Louisiana equal but separate law violated Homer Plessy's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Justice Brown delivered the Court's majority opinion May 18, 1896. It dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment claim almost without argument, citing an earlier ruling and pointing out that segregation is not slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment claim was, Brown admitted, was more complicated. To understand its complications we have to tum back to the 1875 Civil Rights Act passed by a lame-duck Congress, partially in honor of its main advocate Charles Sumner, who had recently died. The most comprehensive civil rights act passed after the Civil War, it forbade numerous acts of racial discrimination. But in 1883 the Supreme Court by an eight to one majority declared the act unconstitutional. The lone dissenter was Justice Jahn Marshall Harlan, the only southerner on the Court and a fonner slave-owner.
Given the Fourteenth Amendment's various guarantees, this decision might seem bizarre, but the Court found justification in a close reading of the amendment. The Civil Rights Act forbade racially discriminatory acts by private parties. The Fourteenth Amendment's final three clauses limit state action, not the action of individuals. The Court's point was not to condone racial discrimination; it was simply to make clear the limits of feder--a1 power under the Fourteenth Amendment. If an illegal act was commit. ted by a private individual, it was up to an individual state to intervene. The federal government's role was to control state actions.
Of course, with whites back in control of southern states after Reconstuction, the chances of states actually punishing racial discrimination was slim. On the contrary, many began to pass Jim Crow legislation.
The issue in Plessy is how far a state can go: is a state law mandating the assortment of races on intrastate travel a violation of Fourteenth.. Amendment guarantees?
In his decision Brown first establishes that every state has certain police powers that can be used for the public good. In Yick Wo v Hopkins (1886) the Supreme Court had ruled that the use of those police powers was constitutional insofar as the law mandating them was reasonable. The question facing the Court in Plessy, therefore, was whether the Louisiana law was reasonable.
In determining the question of reasonableness, [it argued, a legislature] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order: 163 US 537 at 550 (1896).
According to this standard, the Louisiana law was deemed constitutional. Indeed, to stress its reasonableness Brown cites the antebellum Massachusetts case of Roberts v. City of Boston (1849). Speaking for the court~Lemuel Shaw, Hennan Melville's famous father-in-law, declared that segregated schools did not violate the Massachusetts constitution's guarantee of equality before the law.
In allowing the legislature great latitude in defining reasonableness, the Supreme Court exercised restraint, refusing to interfere with the legislature's power to make laws. This restraint has puzzled some legal scholars beca~se this Court is noted for its judicial activism, especially on The crucial figure in the first instance is Tourgee. A close reading of Tourgee's fiction reveals that he often used it to rehearse legal arguments that later made their way into court.1I For instance, even before he took Plessy's case, he imagined the general strategy that he would take in Pactolus Prime, an 1890 novel about 4black' characters who could pass as 'white.' In addition to allowing him to rehearse that general strategy, the novel also allowed him to imagine specific arguments that he could draw upon later. In one of his most ingenious arguments before the Supreme Court, Tourgee pointed to Plessy's mixed blood to claim that the Louisiana law conferred upon the conductor 'the power to deprive one of the reputation of being a white man, or at least to impair that reputation.' In turn, rep.. utation, he claimed, is a fonn of property because it can affect earning power. Thus, the law deprived Plessy, at least seven eighths of him, of the reputation of a white man and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property. This argument was first worked out in Pactolus Prime when Tourgee has his black protagonist advise a young mulatto training for the law to pass as white. Repeating his character's argument in his brief to the Supreme Court Tourgee asks, How much would it be worth to a young man entering upon the practice of law, to be regarded as a white man rather than a colored one? Six-sevenths of the population are white. Nineteentwentieths of the property of the country is owned by white people. 12 If Tourgee used his fiction to rehearse legal arguments that he would make in support of blacks, those rehearsals in tum helped to determine the form of his novels. In a subtle way, that fonn suggests a Thirteenth Amendment argument. It does so by challenging both a literary and legal tradition that focusses on the concerns of only white Americans. Tourgee's most important statement defining the problems facing those treating blacks in fiction is 'The South as a Field for Fiction,' which appeared in December 1888.
The title alone indicates two ways in which Tourgee invited a reconsideration of what constitutes American literature. First, to emphasize the importance of the South was to alter the narrative by which a New England literary tradition expands into an American one. Second, for Tourgee the South did not mean the white South but the region in which the lives of blacks and whites most prominently intersect. Thus an important task for the writer of southern fiction was to go beyond existing representations of bl~cks.
About the Negro as a man, with hopes, fears and aspirations like other men [Tourgee writes], our literature is very nearly silent. Much has been written of the slave and something of the freedman, but thus far no one has been found able to weld the new life to the old. This indeed is the great difficulty to be overcome. As Law Text Culture -soon as the American Negro seeks to rise above the level of the former time, he finds himself confronted with the past of his race and the woes of his kindred (Tourgee 1888: 409).
In Pactolus Prime, which was begun as he was writing his essay and serialized from December 1888 to March 1889, Tourgee, with mixed success, tries to find a formal solution to overcome the great difficulty that he identifies. That When a man has emerged from slavery and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitant of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevat ion when he takes the ranks of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the law, and when his rights as a citizen or a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected: 109 US 3 at 26 (1883).
By attempting to find a fictional form to show how the freedman~s life is still welded to his life as a slave, Tourgee undercut Bradley's logic. The point is not that at some time the freedman should not take the 'ranks of the mere citizen,' it is simply that in such a short time after emancipation the effects of slavery were not yet over. Indeed, to refer to blacks in this period as the 'special favorite of the law,' is to betray a lack of understanding of their actual social conditions.
Prior to the Civil Rights Cases the courts had recognized those conditions and how they were affected by the heritage of slavery by mling that the Thirteenth Amendment did not simply ban slavery and involuntary servitude, but also acts which branded freedmen with a 'badge of servitude.' For Tourgee and Harlan Jim Crow laws did just that and thus violated the Thirteenth Amendment If the majority implied that the Louisiana law was reasonable because natural social differences existed between blacks and whites, Tourgee linked those differences to the history of slavery. As his fiction dramatized, it was not enough simply to abolish slavery, so long as the effects of slavery's history remained. Indeed, insofar as Grady makes clear that no one in the New South wanted a return to slavery,it could be argued that Twain's portrayal of the inhumanity of slavery does not explicitly take sides in the post-Reconstruction debate. My point is not that Twain lacks concern for blacks after emancipation. Indeed, we can even read both novels as allegorical comments on the conditions of blacks in the post-Reconstruction period. Nonetheless, they do not explicitly link the condition of slaves with that of freedmen. The same could not be said of Tourgee's works.
The worst evil of slavery in Pactolus Prime is not the reduction of human beings to property. It is the production of a racism that continues to brand even freedmen with a badge of inferiority. According to Pactolus, 'Slavery was never half so great a curse as that brand of infamy which stamps the soul at its birth with ineradicable inferiority' (Tourgee 1890: 45). The end of slavery does not mean an end to this infamy.
'There are other examples of Tourgee using works of fiction as a testing ground for arguments that he would make in courts of law. I will come back to a complicated one at the end. But first I want to tum to examples, not of the literary imagination shaping legal arguments, but of the Supreme Court's decision evoking a literary response.
Law Text Culture • I can start with Plessy's relation to the African-American literary tradition.
Few doubt the importance of W. E. B. Du Bois' notion of double consciousness for a portion of that tradition. What has not been noted is the relation between Du Bois' definition and Plessy. The major reason why no relation has been acknowledged is that in his definition Du Bois makes no explicit reference to the case. Another reason is that most of us come to the definition in The Souls ofBlack Folks~which was published a bit of a distance from the decision in 1903. But we should not forget that the definition first appeared in an 1897 Atlantic Monthly essay; that is, immediately following the ruling. Whether he intended it or not, Du Bois offers one of the most persuasive refutations of an important part of the majority's logic.
Noting that color forced those of African descent to be considered African Americans, not simply Americans, Du Bois declares, After the Egyptian and Indian~the Greek and Roman~the Teuton and Mongolian t the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veilt and gifted with second-sight in this American world,-a world which yields him no [true] se1f-consciousness~but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness t this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,-an American, a Negro; two souls t two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder (DuBois 1897: 194; emphasis added; parenthetical phrase added in Souls).
In tenns of Plessy Du Bois's most important recognition is not simply that the social and historical conditions of African Americans given them two souls, it is that they force them to measure their worth by the standard of whites who deem them inferior. This interiorization of inferiority explains the majority's blindness when it argues, We consider the underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If that be so~it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it: 163 US 537 at 551 (1896).
-
The majority's logic is impeccable. Nothing in the act explicitly claims that 'coloreds' are inferior. For instance, if a white person sat in a colored car he would be subject to arrest just as if a black sat in a white car. Since blacks and whites are treated equally under the law, how can it be argued that the law discriminates against blacks? Du Bois' definition of double consciousness explains why.
If the majority's logic is impeccable, its history and sociology are serious.. ly flawed. The majority claims that blacks 'choose' to impose a reading onto an essentially neutral law. What Du Bois lets us see is that blacks' reading of the law is not a matter of choice. Given the history of race rela.. tions in the country and the social position of blacks in Louisiana, when a predominantly white legislature passed an act mandating the separation of the races, blacks could not help but see it as a desire not to associate with what is perceived to be an inferior race. Indeed, "as Justice Harlan notes;no one should be deceived by the 'thin disguise' of the law's guarantee of equality: 163 US 537 at 562 (1896).
Gary Jacobsohn has argued that 'American citizenship is a source of ident ity as well as rights' (Jacobsohn: 89). The Plessy majority institutionalizes double consciousness as African American identity, an identity that influences the fonn of at least one strain of the African American literary tradi.. March, 1880, entry in his journal, Chesnutt reveals how the success of Tourgee's A Fool's Errand was an inspiration to him to pursue a career as an author (Brodhead 1993: 124-6). As he began to publish, he was in contact with Tourgee, who suggested that he would write a preface for a collection of Chesnutt's short stories. This suggestion occurred ten years befo(e a collection actually appeared, one without Tourgee's preface.
In a letter to Tourgee 26 September, 1889, Chesnutt described his story 'The Sheriff's Children' as 'dealing with a tragic incident, not of slavery exactly, but showing the fruits of slavery. '(xiv) To me this comment sent the message to Tourgee that Chesnutt had read 'The South as a Field for Fiction,' published the previous December, and was working on dramatizing its message, a message reinforce in much of his short fiction.
Chesnutt's relationship with Tourgee specifically linked up with the latter's involvement in the Plessy case in 1893, which is part of Chesnutt's 'silent period' when he devoteed his energy to providing a secure financial foundation for his family by drawing on his legal, not literary skills. Convinced that the only way to get the Supreme Court to rule on Plessy's behalf was to have the public place pressure on the Court, Tourgee tried to establish a journal to get the public's ear. He asked Chesnutt both to contribute money and be an editor. Chesnutt was interested, although cautious about the financial side of the venture. He told Tourgee that he had 'always looked forward to the literary life, although not specially in the direction of journalism.'(xv) We will never know if Chesnutt would have given up both his existing job and his later career as a writer of fiction to become an editor.
The journal lacked financial support and never got off the ground.
Nonetheless, Chesnutt continued to pay close attention to the outcome of the Plessy case.
Evidence of that attention occurs in allusions in his three novels, all of which were published after Plessy was decided. In an unpublished speech entitled 'The Courts and the Negro' Chesnutt declares:
The opinion in Plessy v Ferguson is, to my mind, as epoch-making as the Dred Scott decision. Unfortunately, it applies to a class of rights which do not make to the heart and conscience of the nation the same direct appeal as was made by slavery, and has not been nor is it likely to produce any such revulsion of feeling. 16
Chesnutt's fiction, I am arguing, attempted the difficult job of producing such a feeling. But I am also making a more general claim: the Thirteenth Amendment argument made by Tourgee in Plessy, I am suggesting, is kept alive in literature even though it dies out in the law. Indeed Ironically, however, affirmative action is legitimated by the same constitutional principle upheld in Plessy; that is, racial classifications are acceptable so long as they are a reasonable measure to promote the social good. 17 The debate over affinnative action brings me to my final example of the literary imagination's relationship to the Plessy case.
The most famous statement in Justice Harlan's dissent is, "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens': 163 US 537 at 559 (1896). Harlan in tum borrows his metaphor from Tourgee's brief to the Court. After pointing out that Because affinnative action is not colorblind, many of its opponents advocate a colorblind Constitution and claim to be the true inheritors of Harlan's and Tourgee's position. 18 What they do not know, however, is that Tourgee first used the metaphor in his 1880 novel, Bricks Without Straw.
In his novel he does not use colorblindness as a positive quality that keeps people from discriminating. Instead, he describes it as a defect that does not allow people to see the actual condition of freedmen. Describing how the freedman had been granted legal rights, the narrator complains, 'Right he had, in the abstract; in the concrete, none. Justice would not hear his voice. The law was still color-blinded by the past' (Tourgee 1880: 35). 19 Appearing in a chapter entitled 'Nunc Pro Tunc,' a legal phrase meaning 'now for then' that describes acts with a retroactive effect allowed to be done after the time when they should be done, Tourgee's literary use of the metaphor indicates that he, like defenders of affinnative action, recognized how colorblindness could become a myopia keeping the law from acting dO iQ affinnatively to help improve the concrete conditions of those that society had historically disadvantaged. 20 Tourgee's use of the conflicted meanings of a metaphor so hotly debated today indicates the extent to which we are still in the wake of Plessy. On the one hand, history teaches us the injustice that can result from not maintaining a colorblind standard in the law. On the other, it teaches us that prematurely to evoke that standard in a society that is not yet colorblind is to continue to disadvantage historically disadvantaged groups. The literary imagination in the United States will continue both to respond and cont ribute to debates over that complicated situation. 
